OT Security for AI Data Centers

Securing the OT that keeps AI data centers running — the power, cooling, safety, and control systems behind every GPU rack.

IT Owns the Compute. OT Keeps It Running.

Power, cooling, and safety all run on OT, and GPU racks have little thermal margin, so an OT fault quickly becomes a compute outage.

Rack density has jumped from roughly 10 to 15 kW to well over 100 kW. A single liquid-cooled GB200 NVL72 AI rack draws about 132 kW — twelve times a typical rack — and twelve times the power in one footprint means twelve times the heat to remove. At that density, power and cooling stop behaving like building services and start behaving like tightly coupled industrial processes.

Those processes are run by operational technology: protective relays and switchgear, generator and UPS controllers, chiller plant PLCs, coolant distribution units, fire panels, access control, and the BMS, EPMS, SCADA, and DCIM platforms that supervise them all. These systems are increasingly converging into one supervisory platform, and they are reachable through vendor remote access, integration gateways, and business-class internet connections that sit outside IT governance.

Security has to cover both sides. ProtexICS brings an OT-native approach to AI data center cybersecurity: we start with what could go wrong physically — loss of cooling, loss of power, a false suppression release — and trace the cyber pathways that make it possible.

11 kW

Typical data center rack, 2026 average

132 kW

One GB200 NVL72 AI rack, liquid cooled

12×

The power — and the heat to remove — in one footprint

6,300

Exposed ICS and building automation devices found near US data centers

Four of the Six Core Units Run on OT

An AI data center is built from six core operational units. Only two of them are IT.

Power Infrastructure

Utility substation and switchgear, backup generators, UPS and batteries, busway and rack PDUs.

Cooling & Thermal

Chiller plant and cooling towers, CDUs and the liquid-cooling loop, and CRAH / AHU units.

Safety & Security

Fire detection and suppression, plus physical security: access control, CCTV, and intrusion detection.

Control Systems

BMS, EPMS, and DCIM, with SCADA HMIs, historians, and remote access over every other OT system.

Compute White Space (IT)

Liquid-cooled GPU racks of about 120 to 132 kW — fed entirely by the OT power and cooling systems.

Network Fabric (IT)

NVLink inside racks, plus InfiniBand or Ethernet at 400 to 800 Gb/s between them, with an out-of-band management network for BMCs and DPUs.

Power and Cooling Run on OT

OT controls the electrical chain from utility feed to rack, and the chilled water process that carries heat away from the GPUs.

OT Controls Power from Utility Feed to Rack

  • Utility and substation: HV intake, step-down, and protection relays
  • MV switchgear: transformers and redundant feeds to each hall
  • Generators and ATS: backup power with automatic transfer
  • UPS and batteries: ride-through, plus BESS to smooth GPU power swings
  • Busway and PDUs: to rack power shelves — 48 VDC today, 800 VDC emerging

A manipulated EPMS reading or relay setting can hide an overload or trip an entire hall offline.

Cooling Is Now the Critical Process

  • Cold plates: direct-to-chip loops on GPUs, CPUs, and switches
  • Coolant distribution: pumps, valves, and heat exchangers isolate rack and facility loops
  • Facility water: primary loop carrying heat out to the plant
  • Heat rejection: chillers, dry coolers, or cooling towers
  • Air handling: CRAH units and rear-door coolers for residual heat

Liquid-cooled racks have little thermal margin, so a cooling fault quickly causes an outage.

How Chilled Water Cools an AI Data Center

Every stage runs on PLCs, VFDs, and BMS controls, so each one is an OT pathway to a compute outage.

1

Pretreatment

Makeup water prep from utility or reclaimed sources: strainers for debris, media filters for solids, softening or RO.

2

Treatment

Water chemistry control: corrosion and scale control, biocide dosing, side-stream filtration, and pH, ORP, and conductivity monitoring.

3

Cooling

The central plant: chillers cool the loop, towers or dry coolers reject heat, with waterside economizers and thermal storage.

4

Distribution

To IT equipment: variable-speed pumps, headers to data halls, CDUs to cold plates, and CRAH and rear-door heat exchangers.

The Ten OT Systems Inside an AI Data Center

What each system does, what controls it, the protocols on the wire, and what an attacker could do with it.

1. Utility Substation & Switchgear

Takes high-voltage utility power, steps it down, and protects every downstream circuit with relays and breakers.

  • Controlled by: protective relays and IEDs, breaker trip units, bay controllers, EPMS, substation HMI
  • Protocols: IEC 61850, DNP3, Modbus TCP
  • Attacker could: alter relay settings to disable protection, or spoof meter data to hide overloads

2. Backup Generators

Start automatically on utility loss and carry the site while transfer and paralleling gear shifts the load.

  • Controlled by: genset controllers, ATS and paralleling PLCs, EPMS, vendor service portals
  • Protocols: Modbus, DNP3, vendor-specific
  • Attacker could: block a start or transfer during an outage, or use vendor monitoring links to bypass segmentation

3. UPS & Battery Systems

Bridge the gap between utility loss and generator pickup, while battery storage smooths GPU power swings.

  • Controlled by: UPS controllers, battery monitoring units, STS controllers, UPS network cards, vendor cloud monitoring
  • Protocols: Modbus TCP, SNMP, vendor-specific
  • Attacker could: force bypass via a UPS network card, or mask battery alarms that reveal failing strings

4. Busway & Rack PDUs

Deliver conditioned power from the electrical room to each rack — the last OT hop before the GPUs.

  • Controlled by: metered and switched PDUs, branch circuit monitors, rack power controllers, EPMS, DCIM
  • Protocols: SNMP, Modbus TCP, REST APIs
  • Attacker could: switch outlets remotely to cut GPU racks, or report false loads that hide overloaded circuits

5. Chiller Plant & Cooling Towers

Reject heat from the facility water loop using chillers, cooling towers, economizers, and thermal storage.

  • Controlled by: plant PLCs, chiller controllers, VFDs, BMS, plant HMI and historian, water treatment controls
  • Protocols: BACnet/IP, Modbus, SNMP
  • Attacker could: change setpoints to starve the cooling loop, or tamper with dosing to foul heat exchangers — hitting every data hall at once

6. CDUs & Liquid-Cooling Loop

Pump filtered coolant to GPU cold plates and isolate the rack loop from facility water.

  • Controlled by: CDU PLCs, pump VFDs, valve actuators, leak and coolant-quality sensors, BMS, DCIM
  • Protocols: Modbus TCP, BACnet/IP, Redfish
  • Attacker could: alter pump or valve commands to cut flow, or hide leak alarms so coolant reaches IT — tripping GPUs within minutes

7. CRAH & AHU Units

Remove residual heat from air-cooled networking and storage gear, and hold hall temperature and humidity.

  • Controlled by: DDC controllers, fan VFDs, rear-door HX controls, BMS / BAS workstation
  • Protocols: BACnet/IP, Modbus, SNMP
  • Attacker could: change fans or setpoints to overheat switches, or shift humidity to risk condensation or static

8. Fire Detection & Suppression

Detects smoke early and releases clean agent or pre-action water. Life safety overrides every other system.

  • Controlled by: fire alarm control panels, releasing panels, VESDA, hardwired interlocks, BACnet gateway to the BMS
  • Protocols: hardwired I/O, BACnet gateways
  • Attacker could: trigger a false release onto live racks, or suppress alarms to delay fire response

9. Physical Security

Controls who enters the site, halls, cages, and OT rooms, and records what happens there.

  • Controlled by: access control panels, card readers, IP cameras, video recorders, intrusion sensors, security console
  • Protocols: OSDP, ONVIF, IP video
  • Attacker could: unlock doors or clone badges to gain entry, or hijack cameras as a foothold — cyber access becomes physical access

10. BMS, EPMS & DCIM

The supervisory layer that monitors and commands systems 1 to 9 through HMIs, historians, and remote access.

  • Controlled by: BMS, EPMS, and SCADA servers, integration platforms, edge gateways, operator HMIs, vendor remote access
  • Protocols: OPC UA, MQTT, BACnet/IP, Modbus TCP, REST APIs
  • Attacker could: reach power, cooling, and safety from one breach — lost cooling, overloaded circuits, false suppression release

Protocols vary by vendor and site. Passive discovery confirms what is actually on the wire.

Security Must Start at Design, Not Handover

Factory-integrated modules arrive with pre-programmed PLCs, remote-access paths, and default settings. Security requirements must enter at design and commissioning.

1

Site & Power

Campus siting follows grid capacity. The utility interconnect and substation come first.

2

Shell & MEP

A powered shell, with prefabricated power and cooling skids or modules.

3

White Space Fit-Out

Halls, racks, busway, manifolds, fiber, and OT network cabling installed.

4

Commission & Operate

Integrated systems testing, BMS/EPMS/SCADA integration, and handover.

Four Ways a Cyberattack Causes Physical Harm

A BMS compromise can cascade: lost cooling, overloaded circuits, false suppression release.

Exposed or Shadow OT

Researchers found 6,300 exposed ICS and building automation devices near US data centers, some on business-class internet outside IT governance.

Cooling Control Compromise

Altered CDU, pump, or valve commands can starve racks of coolant and trip GPU clusters.

Power Monitoring Abuse

Manipulated EPMS, relay, or UPS data can hide overloads or force unplanned transfers and trips.

Vendor Remote Access

Maintenance links and gateways can bypass segmentation and reach BMS, EPMS, and CDU networks.

Three Ways ProtexICS Secures Data Center OT

We start with one question: what could go wrong physically, and which cyber pathway makes it possible? Aligned to IEC 62443, NIST CSF, NIST SP 800-82, and ISO 27001.

Assessments

  • Ranked cyber-physical risks
  • Cyber-informed hazard reviews
  • IEC 62443 / NIST gap ratings
  • OT asset inventory and roadmap
Learn more →

Cybersecurity Reviews

  • OT/IT segmentation and architecture review
  • Vendor remote-access and modular-build review
  • OT program review
  • OT network documentation
Learn more →

Training

  • Custom courses for facilities, controls, and security teams
  • IEC 62443, NIST SP 800-82, NERC CIP
  • Executive-to-operator tracks
See the data center track →

Four OT-Native Methods, No Active Scanning

Passive observation, documents, and interviews — never active scans of live control systems.

OT Bowtie Assessment

Map threats, barriers, and consequences for loss of cooling, loss of power, and false suppression discharge.

CyberPHA / HAZOP

Add cyber causes to facility hazard reviews so reliability, safety, and security share one risk view.

IEC 62443 & NIST Gap Analysis

Rate the maturity of zones and conduits across BMS, EPMS, SCADA, and CDU networks, with a multi-year roadmap.

Passive OT Monitoring

SPAN/TAP capture builds an asset inventory of live 24/7 systems with zero packets injected.

A Typical Engagement Runs 4 to 12 Weeks

You leave with a ranked risk list and a roadmap that facilities and security teams can both act on.

1

Scope

Agree on sites, systems, and stakeholders. Collect drawings and network documents.

2

Validate

Passive SPAN/TAP capture, document review, and interviews with facilities staff.

3

Analyze

Bowtie and CyberPHA workshops, plus IEC 62443 and NIST gap ratings.

4

Report

Ranked risks, OT asset inventory, and a multi-year remediation roadmap.

Sources: Uptime Institute survey, 2026; HPE GB200 NVL72 QuickSpecs, 2025; NVIDIA DGX GB200 guide; NVIDIA 800 VDC architecture, 2025–2026; TrendAI Research, An Invisible Attack Surface, 2026. Unfamiliar terms are defined in the acronym list below.

Data Center OT Acronyms

The terms facilities, controls, and security teams use when they talk about power, cooling, and building systems.

AHU
— Air handling unit
API
— Application programming interface
ATS
— Automatic transfer switch
BACnet
— Building Automation and Control Networks
BAS
— Building automation system
BESS
— Battery energy storage system
BMC
— Baseboard management controller
BMS
— Building management system
CCTV
— Closed-circuit television
CDU
— Coolant distribution unit
CIP
— Critical Infrastructure Protection (NERC)
CRAH
— Computer room air handler
CSF
— Cybersecurity Framework (NIST)
CyberPHA
— Cyber process hazard analysis
DCIM
— Data center infrastructure management
DNP3
— Distributed Network Protocol 3
DPU
— Data processing unit
EPMS
— Electrical power monitoring system
GPU
— Graphics processing unit
HAZOP
— Hazard and operability study
HMI
— Human-machine interface
HV / MV
— High voltage / medium voltage
I/O
— Input/output
ICS
— Industrial control system
IEC
— International Electrotechnical Commission
ISO
— International Organization for Standardization
IT
— Information technology
MEP
— Mechanical, electrical, and plumbing
MQTT
— Message Queuing Telemetry Transport
NERC
— North American Electric Reliability Corporation
NIST
— National Institute of Standards and Technology
NVL72
— NVIDIA rack of 72 GPUs linked by NVLink
ONVIF
— Open Network Video Interface Forum
OPC UA
— OPC Unified Architecture
OSDP
— Open Supervised Device Protocol
OT
— Operational technology
PDU
— Power distribution unit
PLC
— Programmable logic controller
REST
— Representational state transfer
SCADA
— Supervisory control and data acquisition
SNMP
— Simple Network Management Protocol
SPAN
— Switched port analyzer (port mirroring)
STS
— Static transfer switch
TAP
— Test access point
TCP
— Transmission Control Protocol
UPS
— Uninterruptible power supply
VDC
— Volts direct current
VFD
— Variable frequency drive

Start with One Question

What could go wrong physically, and which cyber pathway makes it possible? Let’s scope your sites, systems, and stakeholders.

Schedule a Consultation